This paper is also available in pdf.
An increasing number of systems, from pay-TV to electronic
purses, rely on the tamper resistance of smartcards and other security
processors. We describe a number of attacks on such systems - some
old, some new and some that are simply little known outside the chip
testing community. We conclude that trusting tamper resistance is
problematic; smartcards are broken routinely, and even a device that
was described by a government signals agency as `the most secure
processor generally available' turns out to be vulnerable. Designers
of secure systems should consider the consequences with care.
This paper was published by the USENIX Association in The Second
USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce Proceedings, Oakland,
California, November 18-21, 1996, pp 1-11, ISBN 1-880446-83-9. It won
the best paper award at that conference.
Many early cryptographic systems had some protection against the
seizure of key material. Naval code books were weighted; rotor machine
setting sheets were printed using water soluble ink; and some one-time
pads were printed on cellulose nitrate, so that they would burn
rapidly if lit [Kah67].
But such mechanisms relied on the vigilance of the operator, and
systems were often captured in surprise attacks. So cryptographic
equipment designed in recent years has often relied on technical means
to prevent tampering. An example is the VISA security module, commonly
used in banks to generate and check the personal identification
numbers (PINs) with which customers authenticate themselves at
automatic teller machines. It is basically a safe containing a
microcomputer that performs all the relevant cryptographic operations;
the safe has lid switches and circuitry which interrupts power to
memory, thus erasing key material, when the lid is opened [VSM86]. The idea is to deny the bank's programmers
access to customer PINs and the keys that protect them; so when a
customer disputes a transaction, the bank can claim that the customer
must have been responsible as no member of its staff had access to the
PIN [And94].
Evaluating the level of tamper resistance offered by a given
product is thus an interesting and important problem, but one which
has been neglected by the security research community. One of the few
recent articles that discuss the subject describes the design of the
current range of IBM products and proposes the following taxonomy of
attackers [ADD+91]:
The critical question is always whether an opponent can obtain
unsupervised access to the device [Mor94]. If the
answer is no, then relatively simple measures may suffice. For
example, the VISA security module is vulnerable to people with
occasional access: a service engineer could easily disable the tamper
protection circuitry on one of her visits, and extract key material on
the next. But this is not considered to be a problem by banks, who
typically keep security modules under observation in a computer room,
and control service visits closely.
But in an increasing number of applications, the opponent can
obtain completely unsupervised access, and not just to a single
instance of the cryptographic equipment but to many of them. This is
the case that most interests us: it includes pay-TV smartcards,
prepayment meter tokens, remote locking devices for cars and SIM cards
for GSM mobile phones [And95]. Many such systems
are already the target of well funded attacks.
So in what follows, we will assume that all attackers can obtain
several examples of the target equipment. We will also ignore
tampering at the circuit board level (though this has caused losses,
for example, with prepaid electricity meters [AB96]) and rather concentrate on attacks aimed at
recovering crypto key material stored in smartcards and other
chip-level security processors.
The typical smartcard consists of an 8-bit microprocessor with ROM,
EEPROM and RAM, together with serial input and output, all in a single
chip that is mounted on a plastic carrier. Key material is kept in the
EEPROM.
Designers of EEPROM based devices face a problem: erasing the
charge stored in the floating gate of a memory cell requires a
relatively high voltage. If the attacker can remove this, then the
information will be trapped.
Early smartcards received their programming voltage on a dedicated
connection from the host interface. This led to attacks on pay-TV
systems in which cards were initially enabled for all channels, and
those channels for which the subscriber did not pay were deactivated
by broadcast signals. By covering the programming voltage contact on
their card with tape, or by clamping it inside the decoder using a
diode, subscribers could prevent these signals affecting the
card. They could then cancel their subscription without the vendor
being able to cancel their service.
Some cards are still vulnerable to this kind of attack, and it
gives rise to a sporadic failure mode of some card-based public
telephone systems: telephones where the relevant contact is dirty or
bent may fail to decrement any user's card. However, the cards used
nowadays in pay-TV decoders generate the required 12 V from the
normal 5 V power supply using an on-chip oscillator and
diode/capacitor network. This can push up the cost of an attack, but
does not make it impossible: large capacitors can be identified under
a microscope and destroyed with lasers, ultrasonics or focused ion
beams. A chip prepared in this way can be investigated at will without
the risk of erasing the EEPROM.
So our task is to classify the various logical and physical attacks
on security processors and get some idea of the cost involved.
Unusual voltages and temperatures can affect EEPROM write
operations. For instance, for the PIC16C84 microcontroller, a trick
has become widely known that involves raising VCC to VPP - 0.5 V
during repeated write accesses to the security bit. This can often
clear it without erasing the remaining memory.
For the DS5000 security processor, a short voltage drop sometimes
released the security lock without erasing secret data. Processors
like the 8752 that can be used with both internal and external memory
but that limit the switch between them to resets have been read out
using low voltages to toggle the mode without a reset. Low voltage can
facilitate other attacks too: at least one card has an on-board
analogue random number generator, used to manufacture cryptographic
keys and nonces, which will produce an output of almost all 1's
when the supply voltage is lowered slightly.
For these reasons, some security processors have sensors that cause
a reset when voltage or other environmental conditions go out of
range. But any kind of environmental alarm will cause some
degradation in robustness. For example, one family of smartcard
processors was manufactured with a circuit to detect low clock
frequency and thus prevent single-stepping attacks. However, the wild
fluctuations in clock frequency that frequently occur when a card is
powered up and the supply circuit is stabilising, caused so many false
alarms that the feature is no longer used by the card's operating
system. Its use is left to the application programmer's
discretion. Few of them bother; those who do try to use it discover
the consequences for reliability. So many cards can be single-stepped
with impunity.
For similar robustness reasons, the under-voltage and over-voltage
detection circuitry in many devices will not react to transients. So
fast signals of various kinds may reset the protection without
destroying the protected information, and attacks of this kind are now
known in the community for quite a number of devices.
Power and clock transients can also be used in some processors to
affect the decoding and execution of individual instructions. Every
transistor and its connection paths act like an RC element with a
characteristic time delay; the maximum usable clock frequency of a
processor is determined by the maximum delay among its elements.
Similarly, every flip-flop has a characteristic time window (of a few
picoseconds) during which it samples its input voltage and changes its
output accordingly. This window can be anywhere inside the specified
setup cycle of the flip-flop, but is quite fixed for an individual
device at a given voltage and temperature.
So if we apply a clock glitch (a clock pulse much shorter than
normal) or a power glitch (a rapid transient in supply voltage), this
will affect only some transistors in the chip. By varying the
parameters, the CPU can be made to execute a number of completely
different wrong instructions, sometimes including instructions that
are not even supported by the microcode. Although we do not know in
advance which glitch will cause which wrong instruction in which chip,
it can be fairly simple to conduct a systematic search.
A typical subroutine found in security processors is a loop that
writes the contents of a limited memory range to the serial port:
We can look for a glitch that increases the program counter as
usual but transforms either the conditional jump in line 3 or the loop
variable decrement in line 6 into something else.
Finding the right glitch means operating the card in a repeatable
way. All signals sent to it have to arrive at exactly the same time
after reset for every test run. Many glitches can be tested for every
clock cycle, until one of them causes an extra byte to be sent to the
serial port. Repeating it causes the loop to dump the remaining
memory, which if we are lucky will include the keys we are looking
for.
Output loops are just one target for glitch attacks. Others are
checks of passwords, access rights and protocol responses, where
corruption of a single instruction can defeat the protection. A
possible software countermeasure might be to avoid single-point-of
failure instructions. This was common enough in the old days of
unreliable hardware: a senior Cambridge computer scientist recalls
that in the 1950's a prudent system programmer was someone who, having
masked off three bits, would verify that the result did not exceed
seven!
Hardware countermeasures include independent internal clock
generators that are only PLL synchronized with the external reference
frequency.
Physical attacks on some microcontrollers are almost trivial. For
example, the lock bit of several devices with on-chip EPROM can be
erased by focusing UV light on the security lock cell, which is
located sufficiently far from the rest of memory.
Current smartcards are slightly harder to attack, but not very much
harder. They generally have little to prevent direct access to the
silicon; the marketing director of a smartcard vendor claimed that
there was simply no demand from their users for anything really
sophisticated [Mae94]. The most that appears to
be done is a capacitive sensor to detect the continued presence of the
passivation layer [RE95], or an optical sensor
under an opaque coating [AndA]. Similar robustness
considerations apply to these detectors as to the ones discussed
above; they are often not used, and when they are, they are fairly
easy to detect and avoid.
Anyway, the typical chip module consists of a thin plastic basis
plate of about a square centimetre with conductive contact areas on
both sides. One side is visible on the final card and makes contact
with the card reader; the silicon die is glued to the other side, and
connected using thin gold or aluminium bonding wires. The chip side of
the plastic plate is then covered with epoxy resin. The resulting chip
module is finally glued into the card, which is available in ISO
credit card format, in miniature format for some GSM systems, or in
the case of some prepayment electricity meter systems and pay-TV
systems resembles a small plastic key.
Removing the chip is easy. First, we use a sharp knife or hand
lathe to cut away the plastic behind the chip module until the epoxy
resin becomes visible. Now we settle a few drops of fuming nitric
acid (>98% HNO3) on the resin and wait a few minutes until
some of it has dissolved (the process can be accelerated by heating up
the acid with an infra-red radiator). Before the acid dissolves too
much epoxy and gets solid, we wash acid and resin away by shaking the
card in acetone. We repeat this procedure around five to ten times
until the silicon surface of the die is fully exposed. The chip can
then be washed and will be fully functional unless one of the bonding
wires has been damaged.
Figure 1: Fully functional smartcard processor with covering
plastic removed for microprobing experiments. All tools necessary for
this preparation were obtained for US$30 in a pharmacy.
Functional tests with pay-TV and prepaid phone smartcards have
shown that EEPROM content is not affected by hot nitric acid. No
knowledge beyond school chemistry is necessary; the materials are
easily available in any chemistry lab, and several undergraduate
students have recently reported the successful application of this
method on an Internet mailing list dedicated to amateur smartcard
hacking. Fuming nitric acid is an aggressive oxidant and should be
handled carefully (especially when using flammable liquids such as
acetone), but it does not affect silicon, silicon oxide, silicon
nitride, or gold as used on the chip and its contacts. The aluminium
used in the metal layer of the chip is covered at once with a thin
oxide layer and is also unaffected. Nitric acid is commonly used
anyway to clean chip surfaces during manufacture.
There are commercial IC package removal machines used in process
quality control, which expose the chip to an HNO3 vapor
stream that not only dissolves the resin but also transports away the
waste products. This leaves a somewhat cleaner die surface than our
manual method, but these machines use a lot of acid and need to be
cleaned after use. So even professional chip analysis laboratories
extract the chip manually if only a few packages have to be opened.
Most chips have a passivation layer of silicon nitride or oxide,
which protects them from environmental influences and ion
migration. This is not affected by nitric acid; chip testers typically
remove it using dry etching with hydrogen fluoride, a process that is
not as easily performed by amateur hackers.
But dry etching is not the only option. Another approach is to use
microprobing needles that remove the passivation just below the probe
contact point using ultrasonic vibration. Laser cutter microscopes
commonly used in cellular biology laboratories have also been used to
remove the passivation locally. Some testing laboratories have sets of
nine microprobes so that the card bus can be read out during real time
operation [BVR95].
It is also normal to remove the passivation before using an
electron beam tester to access on-chip signals, because the secondary
electrons emitted by the chip surface accumulate a positive charge on
the passivation layer which causes the signals to disappear after a
few seconds. One might therefore think that such attacks would require
dry etching facilities. However, in some experiments with an electron
beam tester, we have found that the charge accumulation effect is less
serious when the chip is still covered with a thin dirt layer of
HNO3 and resin remains, which is probably weakly
conductive. We suggest that a suitable weakly conductive layer might
be deposited on top of the passivation layer as an alternative way of
preventing the charge build-up.
The techniques described above have been successfully used by class
I attackers - amateur pay-TV hackers, students and others with limited
resources. We will now briefly describe some of the techniques
available in professionally equipped semiconductor laboratories, of
which there are several hundred worldwide. Some of these are situated
in universities (three in the UK, for example), and it has happened
that class I attackers get access to professional equipment in the
course of student projects.
A recent article [BFL+93] gives an overview
of a technique developed for reverse engineering chips at the
Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge. The authors of that paper first
developed techniques for cleanly etching away a layer of a chip at a
time. One innovation is a technique to show up N and P doped layers
using the Schottky effect: a thin film of a metal such as gold or
palladium is deposited on the chip creating a diode which can be seen
with an electron beam. Images of successive layers of a chip are then
fed into a PC with image processing system software that reduces the
initially fuzzy image to a clean polygon representation and identifies
common chip features.
The system has been tested by reverse engineering the Intel 80386
and a number of other devices. The 80386 took two weeks, and it
usually takes about six instances of a chip to get it right. The
output can take the form of a mask diagram, a circuit diagram or even
a list of the library cells from which the chip was constructed.
Once the layout and function of the chip are known, there is an
extremely powerful technique developed by IBM for observing it in
operation, without even having to remove the passivation layer. The
tester places a crystal of lithium niobate over the feature whose
voltage is to be monitored. The refractive index of this substance
varies with the applied electric field, and the potential of the
underlying silicon can be read out using an ultraviolet laser beam
passed through the crystal at grazing incidence. The sensitivity of
this technique is such that a 5 V signal of up to 25 MHz can
be read [Wie90], and we understand that it is a
standard way for well funded laboratories to recover crypto keys from
chips of known layout. When attacking a smartcard, for example, we
would read the EEPROM output amplifiers.
The response of the protection community to attacks of this kind
has been to develop `conformeal glues', chip coatings that are not
merely opaque and conductive but which also strongly resist attempts
to remove them, usually damaging the underlying silicon in the
process. These coatings are referred to in a FIPS standard [FIP94] and are widely used by the U.S. military,
but are not generally available.
In addition to chip coatings, silicon features may be used to
obscure the design. We have heard of design elements that look like a
transistor, but are in reality only a connection between gate and
source; and 3-input NORs which function only as 2-input NORs. Such
copy traps may use holes in isolating layers or tricks done in the
diffusion layer with ion implantation. However, the layer etching and
Schottky techniques described above can detect them.
Another possibility is to introduce complexity into the chip layout
and to use nonstandard cell libraries. However the chip still has to
work, which limits the complexity; and nonstandard cells can be
reconstructed at the gate level and incorporated in the recognition
software.
A more systematic approach was employed in the U.S. government's
Clipper chip. This had a fusible link system in which the links that
created a classified encryption algorithm and a long term device key
from an unclassified mask were fused after fabrication, and were made
of amorphous silicon to make microscopy more difficult. In addition to
this, the surface of the chip was `salted' with oscillators to make
electromagnetic sensor attacks more complicated.
Details of the fusible link technology can be found in a paper in
the relevant data book [GW93], and from the
scanning electron micrographs there, it is clear that - given enough
effort - the secret information can be recovered by sectioning the
chip (this technique has been used by the Cambridge team on obscure
features in other chips). We are reliably informed that at least one
U.S. chipmaker reverse engineered the Clipper chip shortly after its
launch. However the attacks that discredited the Clipper chip used
protocol failures rather than physical penetration [Bla94] - a topic to which we will return later.
Sectioning is not the only way to reverse engineer a chip whose
surface is well protected. For example, a recently declassified
technique invented at Sandia National Laboratories involves looking
through the chip from the rear with an infra-red laser using a
wavelength at which the silicon substrate is transparent. The
photocurrents thus created allow probing the device's operation and
identification of logic states of individual transistors [Ajl95].
The use of sectioning leads us to a more general, and relatively
unexplored, topic - attacks that involve actively modifying the target
chip rather than merely observing it passively. It is well known that
active opponents can mount much more severe attacks on both
cryptographic protocols and algorithms than passive opponents can, and
the same turns out to be true when reverse engineering chips.
We understand, for example, that production attacks carried out by
some pay-TV pirates involve the use of a focussed ion beam (FIB)
workstation. This device can cut tracks in a chip's metallisation
layer, and deposit new tracks or isolation layers. It can also implant
ions to change the doping of an area of silicon, and it can even build
vias to conductive structures in the lowest layers of the chip. These
machines cost several million U.S. dollars, but low-budget attackers
can rent time on them from various semiconductor companies.
Armed with such a tool, attacks on smartcards become much simpler
and more powerful. A typical attack involves disconnecting almost all
of the CPU from the bus, leaving only the EEPROM and a CPU component
that can generate read accesses. For example, the program counter may
be left connected in such a way that the memory locations will be
accessed in order as the device is clocked (see Fig. 2). Once
this has been done, the attacker needs only a single microprobing
needle or electro-optical probe to read the entire EEPROM
contents. This makes the program much easier to analyse than in
passive attacks, which typically yield only an execution trace; it
also avoids the considerable mechanical difficulties of keeping
several probes simultaneously located on bus lines that are perhaps a
micrometre wide.
Figure 2: Read-out attack modifications on a security
processor performed with a focused ion beam workstation allow easy
access to secret EEPROM content with a single microprobing needle.
In conclusion, it is imprudent to assume that the design of silicon
chips, or the information stored in them, can be kept from a capable
motivated opponent. So how can we protect key material from such an
opponent?
One application in which capable motivated opponents may be
assumed, and where billions of dollars are spent on thwarting them, is
the security of nuclear weapons. The threat model here is
unequivocally class III - rogue states fronted by ``terrorist''
commando teams operating in cahoots with subverted military
personnel. The U.S.A. has led the development of a control technology,
now partially shared with other nuclear and near-nuclear nations, and
the following account has been pieced together from a number of open
sources.
Following the Cuban missile crisis, there was concern that a world
war could start by accident - for example, by a local commander under
pressure feeling that `if only they knew in Washington how bad things
were here, they would let us use the bomb'. There was also concern
that U.S. nuclear weapons in allied countries might be seized by the
ally in time of tension, as U.S. forces there had only token custodial
control. These worries were confirmed by three emergency studies
carried out by Jerome Wiesner, the presidential science adviser.
President Kennedy's response was National Security Action Memo
no. 160, which ordered that America's 7,000 nuclear weapons then
in countries from Turkey to Germany should be got under positive
control, or got out [Sim93].
The U.S. Department of Energy was already working on safety devices
for nuclear weapons, the basic principle being that a unique aspect of
the environment had to be sensed before the weapon would arm. For
example, missile warheads and some free-fall bombs expected to
experience zero gravity, while artillery shells expected to experience
an acceleration of 20,000 g. There was one exception though:
atomic demolition munitions. These are designed to be taken from their
storage depots to their targets by jeep or helicopter, or even hand
carried by special forces, and then detonated using time fuses. So
there is no scope for a unique environmental sensor to prevent
accidental detonation.
The solution then under development was a secret arming code, which
activated a solenoid safe lock buried deep in the plutonium pit at the
heart of the weapon. The main engineering problem was that when the
lock was exposed, for example by a maintenance engineer replacing the
power supply, the code might become known (as with the VISA security
module mentioned above). So it was not acceptable to have the same
code in every weapon, and group codes had to be used; the same firing
code would be shared by only a small batch of warheads.
But, following the Kennedy memo, it was proposed that all nuclear
bombs should be protected using code locks, and that there should be a
`universal unlock' action message that only the president or his legal
successors could give. How could this be securely translated to a
large number of individual firing codes, each of which would enable a
small batch of weapons? The problem became worse when the Carter
administration's policy of `measured response' created a need for a
wide variety of `selective unlock' messages, giving the president
options such as enabling the use of nuclear artillery and air defence
weapons against a Soviet incursion into Germany. It became worse still
with concern that a Soviet decapitation strike against the
U.S. national command authority might leave the arsenal intact but
useless. As is now well known, the solution lies in the branch of
cryptomathematics known as `secret sharing' [Sch96], whose development it helped to inspire, and
which enables weapons, commanders and options to be linked together
with a complexity limited only by the available bandwidth.
In modern weapons the solenoid safe locks have been superseded by
PALs - prescribed action links - about whose design details we have
been able to find no useful open source material. However, it is known
that PALs are considered sufficient only when they can be buried in
the core of a large and complex weapon. With simple weapons (such as
atomic demolition munitions) it is not considered feasible to deny
access to a capable motivated opponent. These weapons are therefore
stored in sensing containers called PAPS (prescribed action protective
system) which provide an extra layer of protection.
Both the big-bomb and PAPS-enhanced systems include penalty
mechanisms to deny a successful thief access to a usable weapon. These
mechanisms vary from one weapon type to another but include gas
bottles to deform the pit and hydride the plutonium in it, shaped
charges to destroy components such as neutron generators and the
tritium boost, and asymmetric detonation that results in plutonium
dispersal rather than yield. Whatever the combination of mechanisms
used in a given design, it is always a priority to destroy the code in
the switch; it is assumed that a renegade government prepared to
deploy ``terrorists'' to steal a shipment of bombs would be prepared
to sacrifice some of the bombs (and some technical personnel) to
obtain a single serviceable weapon.
To perform authorised maintenance, the tamper protection must be
disabled, and this requires a separate unlock code. The devices that
hold the various unlock codes - for servicing and firing - are
themselves protected in similar ways to the weapons. We understand,
for example, that after tests showed that 1 mm chip fragments
survived the protective detonation of a control device carried aboard
airborne command posts, the software was rewritten so that all key
material was stored as two separate components, which were kept at
addresses more than 1 mm apart on the chip surface.
This highlights the level of care that must be taken when
developing security processors that are to withstand capable
attack. This care must extend to the details of implementation and
operation. The weapons testing process includes not just independent
verification and validation, but hostile `black hat' penetration
attempts by competing laboratories or agencies. Even then, all
practical measures are taken to prevent access by possible
opponents. The devices (both munition and control) are defended in
depth by armed forces; there are frequent zero-notice challenge
inspections; and staff may be made to re-sit the relevant examinations
at any time of the day or night.
These mechanisms and procedures have so far succeeded in preventing
rogue governments from stealing (as opposed to making) atomic weapons.
The nuclear business also supplies the only examples known to us of
tamper resistant packages designed to withstand a class III opponent
who can obtain unsupervised physical access. These are the missile
sensors developed to verify the SALT II treaty [Sim94] - which was never deployed - and the seismic
sensor package developed for test ban treaty verification, which was.
In this latter system, the seismic sensors are fitted in a steel tube
and inserted into a drill hole that is backfilled with concrete. The
whole assembly is so solid that the seismometers themselves can be
relied upon to detect tampering events with a fairly high
probability. This physical protection is reinforced by random
challenge inspections.
So if systems have to be protected against class III opponents, we
might hazard the following summary:
The above analysis convinced us that military agencies have limited
confidence in the ability of tamper-resistant devices (and especially
portable ones) to withstand a class III opponent with unsupervised
access. Having read an early draft of this paper, a senior agency
official confirmed that chip contents cannot be kept from a capable
motivated opponent; at most one can impose cost and delay. A similar
opinion was ventured by a senior scientist at a leading chip maker.
Furthermore, the expense and inconvenience of the kind of
protection used in the nuclear industry are orders of magnitude
greater than even major banks would be prepared to tolerate. So what
is the state of the art in commercial security processor design? They
may be vulnerable to a class III opponent, but how about class II and
class I?
Many commercial systems use either security module or smartcard
technology. However, a growing number of designs consist of a
composite package containing processor, memory, tamper detection
circuitry and a battery.
An early example, whose design rationale was published in detail,
is the µABYSS coprocessor developed by IBM. A variety of tamper
resistant packages were tested for ease of penetration and ease of
manufacturing, including stannic oxide lines on glass, piezo-electric
sheets and a number of wire winding techniques. The designers settled
on a four layer wrapping of 40 gauge (80 µm diameter)
nichrome wire surrounding the processor, battery, memory and sensor
circuitry, and embedded in a hard, opaque epoxy filled with silica to
make it harder to machine and more likely to crack under UV laser
ablation [WC87] [Wei87].
This appears to be a promising technology, and increasingly so as
circuit sizes and power consumption shrink. The µABYSS design
protected 260 cm² of card circuitry, but much less is used
in many recent designs. 128 kilobyte SRAM chips are available today
with room temperature data retention currents of less than
1 µA. A small 3 V lithium cell can easily provide this
for a decade.
Many aggressive chemicals used to remove opaque chip packages (such
as fuming nitric acid) have a low electrical resistance and can easily
be detected as long as battery power is available; indeed, they will
often cause critical breaks and short-circuits directly. Power supply
networks could be made from a variety of different conductive and
isolating materials such that practically any useful chemical solvent
will cause at least one part to fail.
Suitable packaging can make it difficult for the attacker to strip
away the protection one layer at a time, so that a successful attack
might require a highly laborious process of manually shorting out the
protective wire winding, guided by X-rays and precise measurements of
the voltage at various points along its length.
There are some subtleties though. One might think that the
protection mechanisms only have to deactivate the power supply; but
low-power SRAM chips remember bit values without a supply voltage at
room temperature reliably for many seconds. By cooling the whole
circuit with liquid nitrogen or helium, an attacker can extend the
reliable power-off memory time to minutes or even hours, which could
be enough to disable the alarm system and reapply power. Longterm
exposure to a constant bit pattern can cause some SRAM cells to adapt
their prefered power-up state accordingly, an effect that can remain
for several days without any supply voltage [Gut96]. Possible countermeasures include SRAM cells
with a well-defined power-up behavior.
Recent examples of battery-backed security module assemblies are
the IBM Transaction Security System [ADD+91] and
the Dallas Semiconductor DS5000 series [Dal93]. The latter devices have been described by a
European signals security agency as the most secure processors
available on general sale; we will now report a successful attack on
them.
One might want to make the tamper resistant module as small as
possible, since hermetic sealing limits power dissipation, because
larger packages are more vulnerable to false alarms, and for simple
cost reasons.
But many applications require much more RAM than can be
conveniently included in a small package, and one established
technique is bus encryption [Bes79] [Bes80] [Bes81]. The CPU
contains hardware for on-the-fly encryption of both the external
address and the data bus. External RAM contains only encrypted data
stored at encrypted addresses. The secret key is stored in a special
battery buffered register on the CPU chip.
The Dallas Semiconductor DS5002FP
microcontroller uses this bus encryption strategy. This Intel 8051
compatible processor is used in a number of financial transaction
terminals and pay-TV access control systems to store secret keys and
execute confidential cryptographic algorithms. On-chip bootloader
firmware allows users to upload unencrypted software; it is then
encrypted and stored in the external memory. The secret key is unique
to each device, which has a special self-destruct pin that allows
external alarms to erase it. A special version (DS5002FPM) features an
additional metal layer die top coating designed to prevent microprobe
attacks.
According to the manual, this layer is a ``complex layout
that is interwoven with power and ground which are in turn connected
to logic for the Encryption Key and Security Logic. As a result, any
attempt to remove the layer or probe through it will result in the
erasure of the security lock and/or the loss of encryption key
bits''. Additional security is provided by pseudo-random dummy
accesses performed on the external bus whenever the CPU core does not
access external memory. In addition, 48 bytes including the reset and
interrupt vectors are located on chip. Access to them also results in
external dummy RAM access cycles, such that anyone observing the
external bus cannot know when the internal RAM is accessed.
The security features of the DS5002FP are at first glance quite
impressive and the manufacturer describes them as ``the most
sophisticated security features available in any
microcontroller''.
The chip uses two block ciphers that are loosely modelled on
DES. The first encrypts addresses and acts on 15-bit blocks; the
second encrypts data and acts on 8-bit blocks. The key of the second
cipher is salted with the address of the byte being encrypted, but its
small block size (which was no doubt dictated by the fact that the
controller is byte oriented) turns out to be a useful feature for the
attacker.
On closer examination, the algorithms show statistical weaknesses
that might allow key recovery using differential cryptanalysis. We
have not studied this in detail yet. In any case the algorithm
strength is a purely economic issue; more rounds can buy more
strength, but at a cost in either clock frequency or transistor
count. Much more interesting is a weakness of the bus encryption
system that is independent of the quality of the encryption
algorithms.
One of us (Kuhn) has designed and demonstrated an effective
practical attack that has already yielded all the secrets of some
DS5002FP based systems used for pay-TV access control and also broken
a code lock provided as a challenge by the German Federal Agency for
Information Technology Security (BSI). The attack requires only a
normal personal computer, a special read-out circuit built from
standard electronic components for less than US$100, and a logic
analyzer test clip for around US$200. It was performed in a student
hardware laboratory at the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg using
only common laboratory tools. Designing the hardware and software and
performing the experiments leading to the final approach required less
than three months. Thus, in the IBM taxonomy, this attack was carried
out by a class I opponent.
The basic idea is simple, but was clearly not considered by the
designers or evaluators of this processor. We call it the ``cipher
instruction search attack'': it works by feeding the CPU with suitably
chosen enciphered instructions and looking to see which of the
resulting plaintext instructions we can recognise from their effects.
For example, we can recognise the three byte instruction
So we reset the CPU and wait until some target instruction is about
to be fetched. Then our read-out hardware replaces it, and our control
software observes the reaction for a few more clock cycles. Then we
repeat the procedure - which we can do over 300 times per second - and
systematically work through all 216 combinations for the
first two encrypted instruction bytes.
We eventually find a two byte combination that sends a bijective
function of the following byte to the parallel port. Assuming the
first two bytes are the ciphertext corresponding to 75h 90h (which has
to be confirmed by further tests), this gives the data bus decryption
function at the address from which the third instruction byte was
fetched. By testing all 28 values for this byte, we can
tabulate the data decryption for one address.
Now we repeat the whole process. However this time we will search
for a one-byte no-operation command (NOP) followed by the same MOV
instruction as before. This effectively increases by one the address
from which the third MOV instruction byte will be fetched.
Although we are now searching for a combination of four encrypted
bytes representing two machine instructions, the search complexity has
not been increased. We know already the correct encrypted value for
one byte (port address 90h) from the previous tabulation of the
encryption function at this address. The first instruction does not
have to be a NOP, as any one-byte instruction that does not affect the
following MOV will do. So the second search loop requires considerably
less than 216 iterations - in fact we typically need less
than 2,500 attempts.
This search process becomes steadily faster as more addresses are
tabulated, and we quickly tabulate the encryption function for a
number of consecutive but still unknown addresses. We are now able to
encrypt and send to the processor a sequence of machine instructions
that simply dumps all the memory and special registers to one of the
I/O ports.
The attack is in reality somewhat more complicated than presented
in this brief overview. The details will be presented in a separate
publication, together with a discussion of possible countermeasures
for future bus encryption based systems. Our point is that a class I
attacker could circumvent the physical protection of the `top'
commercial system with modest effort. As the attack did not exploit
either physical or cryptographic weaknesses, it might be considered a
kind of protocol attack [AN95b].
It is prudent engineering practice to avoid single points of
failure, and especially so where the likelihood of failure is
unknown. This makes it all the more remarkable that the tamper
resistance claims made for smartcards and other commercial security
processors have gone untested for so long. The reader will by now be
convinced that these claims should be treated with circumspection.
Public key techniques offer some solace, as the number of universal
secrets can be greatly reduced - ideally, to a small number of
certification keys, that can then be protected in depth. However,
public key protocols have their own problems [AN95], and we should never forget that the great
majority of actual security failures result from simple blunders in
design, construction and operation [And94] [AB96]. There is no silver bullet.
A prudent engineer will see to it that the penetration of a
moderate number of accessible devices, such as smartcards or payment
terminals, will not be disastrous for the system. As most current
electronic wallet systems use symmetric cryptography with universal
secrets stored in retailers' terminals, they should be designed to
keep on working after these secrets have been compromised - such as by
supporting a fallback processing mode similar to that for credit
cards, with full reconciliation, intrusion detection, hot lists and
security recovery.
But although it is necessary to design commercial security systems
with much more care, it is not sufficient. They must also be subjected
to hostile testing. Readers may compare the nuclear weapons
community's insistence on independent verification and validation with
the aversion of the banking industry to any hostile review of their
systems [And94b]. It is encouraging to note that
some other sectors, such as the prepayment electricity meter industry,
are starting to recognise the value of hostile review [AB96]. Other industries, such as pay-TV, got their
hostile review once their systems were fielded.
Acknowledgements: This paper was largely written while the
authors were guests at the Isaac Newton Institute, Cambridge. We also
acknowledge useful comments from Bob Morris, Gus Simmons, Louis
Guillou and a number of sources who prefer to remain anonymous; and
support from the Fondazione Ugo Bordoni.
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Abstract
1 Tamperproofing of cryptographic equipment
2 Breaking smartcards and microcontrollers
2.1 Non-invasive attacks
1 b = answer_address
2 a = answer_length
3 if (a == 0) goto 8
4 transmit(*b)
5 b = b + 1
6 a = a - 1
7 goto 3
8 ...
2.2 Physical attacks
2.3 Advanced attack techniques
2.4 Advanced protection techniques
3 Commercial security processors
3.1 The Dallas DS5002FP Secure Microcontroller
3.2 Breaking the Dallas chip
MOV 90h, #42h
encoded 75h 90h 42h, as it outputs byte value 42h on parallel port
P1 (address 90h) two bus access cycles later.
4 Conclusion
References